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ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
Marisa Huber*
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolution of the law is inevitable, and in 2006, all three
branches of the California government continued to change
and clarify--or cloud-the realm of legal ethics. The
California State Bar released a number of proposed rules for
public comment, and the California State Bar Standing
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct issued
two formal opinions interpreting the California Rules of
Professional Conduct.' The courts dealt with a myriad of
interesting issues, most notably the practice of law by
nonprofit corporations2 and conflict of interest situations
involving the disqualification of government lawyers and, in
some cases, entire government offices.3 The Legislature
attempted for a third time to pass an exception to California's
strict duty of confidentiality for government lawyer
whistleblowers, but the provision was withdrawn by its
author due to a lack of support.4 On a national level, both the
United States Senate and the United States Sentencing
Commission attempted to strengthen confidentiality with
regard to the attorney-client privilege and its role in
corporate scandal prosecutions.' Finally, the American Bar
* Ethics Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 47; J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara
University School of Law; B.A., International Relations, University of San Diego. This
article is dedicated to my parents, who, by example, instilled in me a deep regard for the
importance of personal and professional ethics.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part III.A (discussing Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic Inc.,
129 P.3d 408 (Cal. 2006)).
3. See infra Part III.B (discussing City and County of San Francisco v.
Cobra Solutions, Inc., 135 P.3d 20 (Cal. 2006); Rhaburn v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 464 (Ct. App. 2006)).
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part V.A.
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Association (ABA) issued seven formal opinions interpreting
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct addressing,
among many other things, a lawyer's use of metadata
embedded in electronic documents.6
The purpose of this article is to alert practicing attorneys
to various legal ethics changes that occurred in California and
the nation in 2006. Section II will cover the California State
Bar's issuance of proposed rules and formal ethics opinions.7
Next, Section III will discuss California ethics cases of note in
2006.8 Section IV will cover California's failed legislative
attempt to create an exception to the attorney's duty of
confidentiality for government lawyer whistleblowers.9
Finally, Section V will discuss national ethics issues including
the attorney-client privilege in federal corporate prosecutions
and ABA formal ethics opinions.' °
II. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR
A. California State Bar Proposed Rules Regarding
Professional Conduct, Permanent Disbarment Sanctions, and
Disclosure of Attorneys' Insured Status
By request of the California State Bar's Board of
Governors, the State Bar Special Commission for the Revision
of the Rules of Professional Conduct continues to evaluate
California's existing professional conduct rules in light of
developments occurring since the last major updates in 1989
and 1992.11 In 2006, the Commission released for public
comment twenty-seven of the proposed new or amended rules
"as part of a comprehensive update and proposed shift to the
format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct." 2
The proposed rules will be released in four separate groups at
successive intervals in 2006 and 2007.'1 There will be a
6. See infra Part V.B.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. California State Bar Releases Proposal to Update Standards, Adopt ABA





20071 ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW 869
public hearing for each group of proposals and a final public
comment period in 2008.14 Overall, the Commission has
recommended keeping a number of existing California rules, 5
endorsed the adoption of some parts of the ABA Model
Rules,16  and framed some entirely new rules.17  The
Commission has also recommended that the new California
rules follow the ABA numbering system in order to promote
national uniformity and to make it easier for lawyers to
compare and contrast the California rules with the Model
Rules and with rules from other states.18
In 2005, the California Supreme Court asked the State
Bar to update a previous proposal recommending permanent
disbarment as a sanction for attorney misconduct.' 9 Pursuant
to this request, in 2006, the State Bar's Committee on
Regulation, Admissions and Discipline sent out for public
comment a proposed rule of court that sets forth guidelines
that the State Bar Court must consider in determining
whether to recommend a permanent disbarment sanction.2 °
14. Id.
15. Id. Existing California rules include those regarding fee sharing among
lawyers. Id.
16. Id. The Commission has endorsed parts of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct including Rule 2.4 regarding lawyers serving as third-
party neutrals, Rules 5.1 to 5.3 regarding supervision duties within a private
firm, and most of Rules 7.1 to 7.5 regarding the marketing of lawyer's services.
Id.
17. Proposal to Update Standards, supra note 11. The Commission has
framed entirely new rules on circumstances in which lawyers and law firms
may agree that departing lawyers will forfeit compensation if they compete with
their former firm. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Wayne Gross, A Rod For Crooked Lawyers, 48 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 55
(2006). Under Proposed California Rule of Court 951.2(e), when recommending
disbarment, the State Bar Court must recommend whether a lawyer should be
prohibited from seeking reinstatement and must consider the following:
conviction of a crime involving malfeasance in public office which involved fraud
or the embezzlement of intentional misuse of public funds; engaging in multiple
instances of the intentional theft or conversion of client funds, resulting in
substantial harm to one or more victims; engaging in the intentional corruption
of the judicial process, including but not limited to bribery, forgery, perjury, or
subornation of perjury; engaging in multiple instances of insurance fraud
committed in the course of the practice of law, including but not limited to
staged accidents, the submission of false or fraudulent claims for the payment of
a loss or injury or repeated instances of runner-based solicitation; engaging in
the unauthorized practice of law when the member knew of his or her
disbarment, resignation or suspension from the practice; the member was
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The proposed rule addresses the issue of double disbarment,
where disbarred lawyers later seek and gain reinstatement,
then get disbarred a second time for misconduct. 21  The
possibility of permanent disbarment will give the State Bar
Courts increased discretion in making disciplinary
recommendations.22 Proponents of the proposed rule claim
that it will serve the important function of enhancing the
public perception of lawyers.23
Finally, in 2006, a California Bar task force
recommended that the state embrace a rule that would
require lawyers to disclose to the Bar whether or not they
carry insurance.24 The proposed rule would also mandate
that uninsured lawyers directly disclose this information to
their clients.25  The task force noted that such disclosure
provisions are in force in seventeen other states.26 However,
no other state requires attorneys to disclose this information
to both his or her clients and the State Bar.27 Proponents of
the rule cite enhanced public protection as a justification for
previously disbarred or resigned with disciplinary charges pending; and
engaging in conduct involving fraud, moral turpitude or a pattern of serious
misconduct that is so egregious that the member should be permanently
disbarred. See id. at 55-56; see also CAL. CT. R. 951.2(e) (Proposed Draft 2006),
available at http'//calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/public-comment/2006/Perm-Disbar-
Prop-Rules951-RADA.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
21. Nancy McCarthy, Board OKs Permanent Disbarment, CAL. ST. B.J.,
Sept. 2006, available at
http://www.ahrc.com/new/index.php/src/news/sub/pressrel/action/ShowMedia/id/
3122. From 1990 to 2005, six attorneys were disbarred twice. Id. Every year,
approximately 100 attorneys are disbarred and approximately another 100
resign with charges pending. Id. Disbarred attorneys are entitled to seek
reinstatement after five years and must demonstrate rehabilitation and their
learning and ability in the law. Id. The proposed rule would additionally
require a lawyer seeking reinstatement to take and pass the California Bar
Exam. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. "Permanent disbarment is a public trust issue," according to the
governor of the State Bar Board of Governors, Holly Fujie. Id.
24. Possible Disclosure Rule for Uninsured Lawyers, CAL. ST. B.J., Jan.
2006. Approximately eighteen percent of California attorneys are uninsured.
Id.
25. Id.
26. James E. Towery, Disclosing Malpractice Coverage: Clients Have a Right
to Know Attorneys' Insurance Status, CAL. ST. B.J., Aug. 2006. Mandatory
disclosure provisions are under consideration in seven states, including
California. Possible Disclosure Rule for Uninsured Lawyers, supra note 24.
27. See Diane Curtis, Malpractice Insurance Disclosure Circulated for
Public Comment, CAL. ST. B.J., July 2006.
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the disclosure requirements.28 Opponents fear that the rule
will create a disproportionate burden on new attorneys and
solo practitioners which may ultimately affect access to
justice by the economically disadvantaged people that these
lawyers serve.29
B. Formal Opinions
In 2006, the State Bar Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct (Committee) issued
two formal opinions."0 These advisory opinions regarding the
ethical propriety of hypothetical attorney conduct are not
binding, but are designed to assist attorneys in
understanding their professional responsibilities under the
California Rules of Professional Conduct. 1
1. Formal Opinion No. 2006-170: Charging Liens in
Contingency Agreements
In this formal opinion, the Committee addressed the
issue of whether an attorney must comply with California
Rule of Professional Conduct 3-300,32 regarding pecuniary
interests that are adverse to clients, when entering into a
contingency fee agreement that contains a provision for a
charging lien.33 Rule 3-300 provides that a member shall not
enter into a business transaction with a client, or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other
pecuniary interest adverse to a client, unless: (1) "[tlhe
transaction or acquisition and its terms are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
28. Id.; see Towery, supra note 26.
29. Kenneth G. Petrulis, Disclosing Malpractice Coverage: Heavy Burden on
Lawyers That Will Restrict Court Access, CAL. ST. B.J., Aug. 2006.
30. The Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct (COPRAC)
is a standing committee of the State Bar Board of Governors. See State Bar of
Cal., Professional Responsibility and Conduct (COPRAC),
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-generic.jsp?cid=10130&id= 1104
(last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
31. See id.
32. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-300 (2006).
33. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl. Responsibility & Conduct,
Formal Op. 2006-170 [hereinafter Formal Op. 2006-170], available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/2006-170.pdf. A charging lien is a lien
created upon the fund or judgment that the attorney recovers, for purposes of
compensation for recovering the fund or judgment. Id. (citing Fletcher v. Davis,
90 P.3d 1216, 1219 (Cal. 2004)).
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transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which should
reasonably have been understood by the client"; (2) "[tlhe
client is advised in writing that the client may seek the advice
of an independent lawyer of the client's choice and is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek that advice"; and (3) "[tlhe
client thereafter consents in writing to the terms of the
transaction or the terms of the acquisition."34  In the
hypothetical facts of this opinion, an attorney agrees to
represent a client as a plaintiff in a personal injury suit
arising from an automobile accident. 5 The attorney and
client enter into a written contingency fee agreement
providing that the attorney's fee will be thirty-three percent
of the client's recovery if the suit is settled before trial, and
forty percent of the recovery if the suit is settled after trial
commences.3 6  The contingency fee agreement complies with
all of the requirements of Business and Professions Code
Section 6147.3' The agreement also provides for the attorney
to have a lien on any settlement or judgment that the
attorney recovers for the client.3 The attorney does not
advise the client to consult independent counsel prior to
consenting to the fee agreement.39
In the case of Fletcher v. Davis, the Supreme Court of
California held that a charging lien in an hourly fee contract
constitutes a security interest adverse to a client, thereby
triggering the requirements of Rule 3-300.4" The court noted
that "a charging lien was not inherent in the nature of the
hourly fee agreement and that it was reasonably foreseeable
34. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-300.
35. Formal Op. 2006-170, supra note 33, at 1.
36. Id.
37. Id. For a contingency fee contract to be enforceable, the attorney must
ensure compliance with safeguards found in Section 6147 of the California
Business and Professions Code, which requires, among other things, that the
agreement must be in writing, that the client is notified that the fee is
negotiable, and that the client is notified of the percentage of the fee as well as
the manner in which costs and disbursements will affect the size of the fee and
the client's recovery. Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6147 (Deering
2006)). Contingency fee agreements are permitted in California for the pursuit
of most civil claims and are generally favored because they allow access to the
courts by persons who might otherwise have no opportunity for redress due to




40. Id. at 3.
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that the charging lien could significantly impair the client's
interest by delaying payment of the recovery or proceeds until
any dispute over the lien could be resolved."'"
The Committee considered whether the policy
considerations underlying the Fletcher decision should lead to
the conclusion that Rule 3-300 also applies to charging liens
in contingency fee contracts, and .concluded that material
differences between hourly and contingency fee contracts
require a different analysis and lead to a different result.42
The Committee found such material differences to include the
fact that charging liens are inherent in contingency
agreements and they are "almost universally found and
almost universally uncontroversial in such contracts."43 This
is because the attorney and client have agreed that the
attorney's fee will be limited to a percentage of a successful
recovery, the attorney and client share the risk of a recovery,
the fee is delayed until the client obtains a recovery, and the
recovery often represents the only source of funds from which
the attorney can ever be paid." Hourly fees, in contrast, are
not in any way limited in relation to the client's recovery, and
a charging lien can tie up the entire recovery pending
resolution of a fee dispute between the attorney and the
client.45 The Committee found that the contingency client's
interests are adequately protected by the attorney's
compliance with Section 6147 of the California Business and
Professions Code, which requires, among other things, that
the agreement be in writing.46 The client is also protected by
Rule 4-200,4' which prohibits attorneys from charging an
41. Formal Op. 2006-170, supra note 33, at 3 (original emphasis omitted).




46. Id. at 6. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6147 (Deering 2006)).
47. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-200 (1992) provides:
(A) A member shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or
collect an illegal or unconscionable fee.
(B) Unconscionability of a fee shall be determined on the basis of all
the facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement is
entered into except where the parties contemplate that the fee will be
affected by later events. Among the factors to be considered, where
appropriate, in determining the unconscionability of a fee are the
following:
(1) The amount of the fee in proportion to the value of the services
20071 873
874 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47
unconscionable fee.4 ' Finally, the Committee found that the
client is additionally protected by case law governing the
attorney's duties in this context. 49 Therefore, the Committee
noted that requiring compliance with Rule 3-300 in
contingency contracts would cause clients to seek
independent legal consultations without any discernable
benefits. °
The Committee ultimately concluded that the inclusion of
a charging lien in the initial contingency fee agreement does
not create an "adverse interest" to the client within the
meaning of Rule 3-300.1 "Unlike a charging lien in an hourly
case, the charging lien is a natural corollary of the
contingency arrangement."52 However, the Committee noted
that "[t]his conclusion is not intended to discourage lawyers
from conforming to the standards established in Rule 3-300 in
their contingency agreements."53
2. Formal Opinion No. 2006-171: Trust Status of
Challenged Funds
In this opinion, the Committee addressed whether an
attorney who has properly withdrawn a fee from a client trust
performed.
(2) The relative sophistication of the member and the client.
(3) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(4) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
member.
(5) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(6) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances.
(7) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
(8) The experience, reputation, and ability of the member or
members performing the services.
(9) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(10) The time and labor required.
(11) The informed consent of the client to the fee.
Id.
48. Formal Op. 2006-170, supra note 33, at 6 (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4-200 (1992)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id.
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account is ethically obligated to return any of the withdrawn
funds to the trust account when the client later disputes the
fee.54 Rule 4-100(A)(2) provides that any portion of trust
account funds that belong to counsel "must be withdrawn at
the earliest reasonable time after [his or her] interest in that
portion becomes fixed," unless the attorney's portion is
disputed by the client for any reason. 5 In such an event,
Rule 4-100(A)(2) further instructs that "the disputed portion
shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved."56
The hypothetical facts of the opinion are as follows.17 A
written fee agreement between the attorney and the client
states that the attorney will be paid a contingent fee equal to
a percentage of the client's "net recovery" in the matter.58
The attorney is entitled to twenty-five percent of the client's
net recovery if the matter is resolved prior to the filing of suit,
and to 33 1/3% of recovery if the matter is resolved any time
thereafter.59 The case settles after a lawsuit is filed, but
before trial commences.6" After the settlement agreement is
executed, the adversary sends a check for $100,000, payable
jointly to the attorney and the client.61  Under Rule 4-
100(B)(1),62 the attorney notifies the client of receipt of funds,
and under Rule 4-100(B)(3),63 the attorney provides the client
54. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl. Responsibility & Conduct,
Formal Op. 2006-171 [hereinafter Formal Op. 2006-171], available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/CAL%202006-17 1.pdf.
55. Id. (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-100(A)(2) (1992)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. "Net recovery" is defined as the total of all amounts received by
settlement of judgment less certain scheduled costs and disbursements. Id.
The agreement complies with Section 6147 of the California Business and
Professions Code in all respects and contains a charging lien. Id.
59. Id.
60. Formal Op. 2006-171, supra note 54.
61. Id.
62. Id. Rule of Professional Conduct 4-100(B)(1) provides that a member
shall "[p]romptly notify a client of the receipt of the client's funds, securities, or
other properties." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-100(B)(1) (1992).
63. Formal Op. 2006-171 supra note 54. Rule of Professional Conduct 4-
100(B)(3) provides:
(B) A member shall:
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other
properties of a client coming into the possession of the member or law
firm and render appropriate accounts to the client regarding them;
preserve such records for a period of no less than five years after final
appropriate distribution of such funds or properties; and comply with
876 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47
with a written accounting.64 The client endorses the check
and signs off on the accounting, approving of the proposed
distribution.6" Under Rule 4-100(A),66 the attorney deposits
the $100,000 in the Client Trust Account (CTA).67 Promptly
upon confirming that the check has cleared, and reasonably
believing the fee to be fixed within meaning of 4-100(A)(2),
the attorney writes one check to the client for $62,000 and
another check to the attorney's general account for fees and
costs of $38,000.68 Pursuant to the client's instructions, the
attorney mails the check to the client and immediately
deposits the other check in the general account.69 One week
later, the client calls the attorney and claims that the fee is
too high for the amount of work actually performed and
requests that the attorney send a check for an additional
$10,000.70
The Committee found that in the situation presented, the
attorney neither received nor held the withdrawn funds for
the benefit of the client.71 Contrarily, at the moment of
any order for an audit of such records issued pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure of the State Bar.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-100(B)(3) (1992).
64. Formal Op. 2006-171, supra note 54. Accounting sets forth: the total
settlement amount of $100,000; the itemized list of costs and disbursements in
aggregate amount of $7,000; one-third of net recovery of $93,000, or $31,000 for
attorney's fee; and remaining balance of $62,000 to client. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Rule of Professional Conduct 4-100(A) states:
(A) All funds received or held for the benefit of clients by a member
or law firm, including advances for costs and expenses, shall be
deposited into one or more identifiable bank accounts labeled "Trust
Account," "Client's Funds Account" or words of similar import,
maintained in the state of California, or, with written consent of the
client, in any other jurisdiction where there is a substantial
relationship between the client or the client's business and the other
jurisdiction.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-100(A) (1992)




71. Id. Money that an attorney holds "for the benefit of clients" includes: (1)
money that belongs to a client; (2) money in which the attorney and client have
a joint interest; (3) money in which a client and a third party have a joint
interest; and (4) money that doesn't belong to a client but which counsel is
nevertheless holding as part of the subject representation. Id. (citing STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, HANDBOOK ON CLIENT TRUST ACCOUNTING FOR
CALIFORNIA ATrORNEYS 13 (2003)).
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withdrawal, the withdrawn funds are the attorney's personal
property by operation of Rule 4-100(A)(2).72 Therefore, the
Committee found that there is no authority in the text of Rule
4-100 or elsewhere to suggest that funds with trust account
status, properly fixed and withdrawn, regain trust account
status simply because the client later disputes the fee. The
fact that the client later expresses remorse, regret or other
dissatisfaction with the amount of the attorney's fee is a
matter of contract to be resolved by an analysis of the
engagement agreement and the respective performance of the
parties.74
III. CASES OF NOTE IN 2006
The California Supreme Court and courts of appeal
issued a number of opinions on a multitude of ethics issues in
2006. The following is a discussion of just a few of those
opinions from categories including the unauthorized practice
of law, conflicts of interest, malpractice, attorney fees,
prosecutorial malpractice and ineffective assistance of
counsel, and the category of lawyers acting as escrow holders.
A. Unauthorized Practice of Law
1. Authority of California Nonprofit Corporations to
Practice Law
There are hundreds of nonprofit corporations practicing
law in California, and in the case of Frye v. Tenderloin
Housing Clinic, the California Supreme Court addressed the
authority of such corporations to do 80. 7' Tenderloin Housing
Clinic (THC) is a nonprofit corporation that employs several
attorneys to assist tenants in the San Francisco Tenderloin
community in asserting their legal rights.76 One of THC's
clients, Roy Frye, brought suit against THC alleging that it
72. Id.
73. Formal Op. 2006-171, supra note 54. Such a conclusion would create a
host of problems for the practical administration of a law office, if, for example,
the withdrawn funds were used to pay staff salaries or bona fide office expenses,
or, if the withdrawal takes place in one tax year while the client's challenge
occurs in the next. Id.
74. Id.
75. Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc., 129 P.3d 408 (Cal. 2006).
76. Id. at 410.
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was not licensed to practice law in California or to represent
tenants.77 Frye alleged that THC was not in compliance with
California Corporations Code section 13406(b). 8 Section
13406(b) provides that a professional law corporation may be
organized as a nonprofit public benefit corporation if it falls
within either of two categories: (1) it is a qualified legal
services project as defined by statute-essentially a legal aid
program; or (2) all of its members and directors are licensed
attorneys, seventy percent of its clients are lower income
individuals or other persons who would not have access to
legal services, and it refrains from entering into contingency
fee agreements. v9 THC's board and membership included
non-lawyers, it did not at all times have a policy restricting
its practice primarily to low-income persons, and it entered
into contingent fee agreements.8 0
Frye sought the return of a specified amount of fees and
costs, statutory and punitive damages, and an injunction."'
He also sought the disgorgement of all of THC's allegedly
unlawfully collected fees and costs plus restitution to each
member of the general public who had paid THC. 2 Frye and
THC eventually entered into a stipulation to settle some of
Frye's claims for an amount representing the contingency fee
that THC collected from Frye.83 The trial court found that
Frye was not entitled to any remedy and granted THC's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.' The court of appeal
reversed in part.85 It found that Section 13406(b) provides
the sole authority under which a nonprofit public benefit
corporation is authorized to practice law. 6 Therefore, in
failing to comply with the statute, the appellate court held
that THC engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.87 The
77. Id. at 412.
78. Id. at 409-10 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 13406(b) (Deering 2006)). THC
represented Frye in a case against his landlord, and won. Id. at 411. THC then
took forty percent of this judgment pursuant to its contingency fee agreement
with Frye. Id.
79. Id. at 414 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 13406(b)).
80. Id. at 415.
81. Frye, 129 P.3d at 412.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 413.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 409.
87. Frye, 129 P.3d at 413.
878 [Vol: 47
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Supreme Court of California granted review. 8
The Supreme Court noted that judicial decisions have
historically held that a corporation could neither practice law
nor employ lawyers to represent third parties because the
profit motive created an inherent conflict of interest for
attorneys and would foster inappropriate commercialization
of the profession.8 9  However, the court noted a number of
exceptions to this general rule, including the 1968
Professional Corporations Act which contains Section
13406(b).9 ° The Act permits the corporate practice of law for
profit, subject to various restrictions intended to safeguard
client interests against the profit motive, including
registration with the State Bar and, as noted above, a
requirement of corporate ownership and governance solely by
attorneys.9 Additionally, the traditional rule "has been
subject to judicial exceptions for nonprofit corporate practice
that developed both prior to and subsequent to the enactment
of the Professional Corporations Act."92 Under the authority
of this case law, legal aid, mutual benefit and advocacy
groups have practiced law in the corporate form, and the
court found no indication that the Legislature intended to
abrogate or challenge these decisions when it enacted Section
13406(b).9 Furthermore, the court noted that public policy
supports efforts to provide access to the courts to all members
of society.94 The court also stated that case law demonstrates
that the First Amendment protects the associational and
expressive rights of persons, both lawyers and non-lawyers, to
88. Id. at 414. Numerous organizations representing more than seventy
nonprofit organizations filed amicus curiae briefs "contending that section
13406(b) does not apply to organizations such as THC and that such
organizations cannot serve in their present form if they are required to conform
to the requirements of that statute." Id. The California State Bar filed an
amicus curiae asserting that "it never has required organizations such as THC
to register and to comply with section 13406(b), and that only five of the
hundreds of nonprofit corporations [in California] that offer legal services to
third parties .. .have registered and organized themselves pursuant to the
statute." Id.
89. Id. at 415-16 (citing People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 209 P. 363,
366 (Cal. 1922)).
90. Id. at 416 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 13400, et seq. (Deering 2006)).
91. Id. (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 13401(b), 13404; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6160, 6165 (Deering 2006)).
92. Id. at 416-17.
93. Frye, 129 P.3d at 417.
94. See id.
20071 879
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join together to employ litigation to seek redress of
grievances.95
Therefore, the court concluded that on the basis of the
evident legislative intent to expand the nonprofit practice of
law, the historical exceptions to the common law rule
prohibiting nonprofit law practice, and constitutional
problems that would be presented by the court of appeal's
interpretation, Section 13406(b) cannot be construed to
govern all nonprofit corporations that provide legal services to
third parties. 96 Additionally, the court found that THC's
failure to register with the State Bar or to comply with
Section 13406(b) was not a cause of injury to Frye, and
therefore, there were no grounds for the disgorgement of
fees .
The court did not conclude what authority THC practiced
law under.9" It mentioned that the State Bar has permitted
numerous nonprofit organizations to practice law without
registering or complying with Section 13406(b) and that the
Supreme Court and other courts frequently award statutory
attorney fees to such nonprofit corporations. 99  However,
given the court's inherent responsibility and authority over
the core functions of admission and discipline of attorneys,
the court believed that the matter should be referred to the
State Bar for further study, followed by a report and specific
recommendations. 100 The court instructed the State Bar to
consider the practical need for additional regulation in
California. 10 1 The State Bar was further instructed to reflect
upon the rationale supporting the general rule against the
corporate practice of law, to reflect upon relevant
constitutional principles, and to determine whether there is
evidence of actual abuse or client endangerment. 102
Ultimately, the State Bar was charged with the duty to
consider whether the potential for harm to clients warrants
95. Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-31 (1963)).
96. Id. at 421.
97. Id. at 423. The court also found that the remedy of disgorgement was
grossly disproportionate to the asserted wrongdoing on THC's part and would
constitute a totally unwarranted windfall to Frye. See id. at 424.
98. Id. at 410.
99. Frye, 129 P.3d at 424.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 426.
102. Id. at 426-27.
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regulation of the nonprofit entity itself.10 3
2. Prohibition of State Administrative Practice by
Defrocked Lawyers
In a case regarding the practice of law by an individual,
rather than a corporation, in Benninghoff v. Superior Court, °4
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a defrocked
lawyer is prohibited from practicing law, which includes
representing parties in state administrative hearings. 105
After attorney Benninghoff pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
defraud the United States and three other felonies, he
resigned from the State Bar with disciplinary charges
pending. 10 6 Thereafter, he represented professional licensees
in state administrative hearings and federal prisoners in
prison transfer applications." 7 The California State Bar filed
an application asking the superior court to assume
jurisdiction over Benninghoffs practice under Business and
Professions Code Section 6180, and the court granted the
order. 108
Benninghoff filed a petition for writ of mandate, claiming
that his practice was permissible because laypeople are
permitted to represent parties in state administrative
hearings.'0 9  The court declined to resolve the issue of
whether laypeople may do so, but even assuming the court
had spoken on the issue, Benninghoff was not just a
layperson-he was a former lawyer.110 The court then noted
that Business and Professions Code Section 6126(b) provides
that "[any person who . . .has resigned from the State Bar
with charges pending, and thereafter practices or attempts to
practice law . . . is guilty of a crime punishable by
103. Id. at 427. In October 2006, the State Bar launched its study of
nonprofit legal practice in California and invited interested parties and the
public to submit comments on the matter. Public Comment Sought on Frye
Ruling, CAL. ST. B.J., Nov. 2006.
104. Benninghoffv. Super. Ct., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759 (Ct. App. 2006).
105. Id. at 761.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6180 (Deering 2006), which
authorizes a court to assume jurisdiction over the law practice of an attorney
who resigns).
109. See id. at 761-62.
110. Benninghoff, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 762-63.
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imprisonment."11' Therefore, "a defrocked lawyer like
Benninghoff may not practice law at all." 1 12 The court found
that in representing parties in state administrative
proceedings, Benninghoff "gave legal advice to his clients and
prepared legal documents attempting to secure their rights,
which called for the application of his 'legal knowledge and
technique,"' all of which constituted the practice of law.
113
The court further noted that provisions in Benninghofls
written agreements with his clients disclaiming any lawyer-
client relationship were ineffective and did not provide an
escape from the superior court's authority to assume
jurisdiction over his practice."' The court of appeal found
that the superior court therefore correctly assumed
jurisdiction over Benninghoff's state administrative
practice. 115 However, it found that the superior court erred in
assuming jurisdiction over Benninghoffs federal
administrative practice because state law cannot restrict the
ability of federal courts and agencies to control who practices
before them."1
6
B. Conflicts of Interest
1. Vicarious Disqualification of Entire Government Law
Office
In City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra
Solutions,1' 7 the Supreme Court of California addressed the
issue of whether an entire government law office should be
vicariously disqualified when the head of that office has a
conflict."' In this case, related technology companies Cobra
Solutions and TeleCon Ltd. (collectively Cobra) retained the
small private law firm of Kelly, Gill, Sherburne and Herrera
for advice on the performance of its contract with the City
and County of San Francisco regarding computer products
111. Id. at 763.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 764 (quoting Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal.3d 535, 543
(1970)).
114. Id. at 767.
115. Id. at 768.
116. Benninghoff, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 768.
117. City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., 135 P.3d 20,
24 (Cal. 2006).
118. Id. at 24.
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and services to be provided to the Department of Building
Inspection (Department).119
About one year later, Dennis Herrera, a named partner
in the firm retained by Cobra, was elected San Francisco City
Attorney. 120  Thereafter, as a result of an investigation
already underway when Herrera was elected, the City
Attorney's Office filed a civil complaint alleging a kickback
scheme involving a Department employee and payments he
received from computer service providers for services they
never performed.12  Further investigation revealed that
$240,000 in checks from Cobra had been deposited into the
bank account of a fictitious business entity created by the
Department employee.122 When Herrera became aware that
Cobra was implicated in the scheme, he took measures to
screen himself from the case. 2 ' In April 2003, the City filed
an amended complaint adding Cobra as a defendant in the
kickback scheme lawsuit. 124
The court faced the question of whether Herrera's ethical
screen was sufficient to protect Cobra's confidences, or if the
entire City Attorney's Office should be vicariously
disqualified. 125  Ultimately, the California Supreme Court
concluded that Herrera and the entire City Attorney's office
must be disqualified. 26 The court noted that in California,
judicial decisions that have upheld the ethical screening of
government attorneys dealt only with subordinate attorneys
and not, as here, with the City Attorney under whom and at
whose pleasure all deputy city attorneys serve. 127 The court
119. Id. at 22-23.
120. Id. at 23.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Cobra Solutions, 135 P.3d at 23. Attorneys working on the case
reported to someone other than Herrera, were instructed not to discuss the case
with Herrera, and "maintained locked files and computer records that were
inaccessible to Herrera." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 26. "Normally, an attorney's conflict is imputed to the law firm as
a whole on the rationale that attorneys, working together and practicing law in
a professional association, share each other's, and their clients' confidential
information." Id. at 25 (citing People v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc., 980
P.2d 371, 383-84 (Cal. 1999)).
126. Id. at 30.
127. Id. at 29 (citing Santa Barbara v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 403 (Ct.
App. 2004); Chadwick v. Super. Ct., 164 Cal. Rptr. 864 (Ct. App. 1980)).
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discussed that "individuals who head a government law office
occupy a unique position because they are ultimately
responsible for making policy decisions that determine how
the agency's resources and efforts will be used."1 28 Attorneys
serving directly under them "cannot be entirely insulated
from those policy decisions, nor can they be freed from real or
perceived concerns as to what their boss wants."12 9
The court also found a "compelling societal interest in
preserving the integrity of the office of a city attorney."130
"Public perception that a city attorney and his deputies might
be influenced by the city attorney's previous representation of
the client, at the expense of the best interests of the city,
would insidiously undermine public confidence in the
integrity of municipal government and its city attorney's
office. " 1
Therefore, the California Supreme Court has adopted a
rule of automatic vicarious disqualification whenever the
head of a government law office has a conflict.132 The dissent
suggested that trial courts should determine on a case-by-
case basis the adequacy of any ethical screening procedures
undertaken by the government law office, rather than making
disqualification of the entire office automatic. 33
2. Non-Disqualification of Entire Government Law
Office
In another case involving government law offices, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of
vicarious disqualification of the public defender's office due to
prior representation of a prosecution witness. 3 4 In Rhaburn
v. Superior Court, defendant Rhaburn was arrested and
appointed a public defender. 35  On the eve of trial, the
prosecutor requested that the public defender's office be
128. Id.
129. Cobra Solutions, 135 P.3d at 29. The power to hire and fire is a potent
one. Id.
130. Id. at 30.
131. Id.
132. See id. (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
133. See id. (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
134. Rhaburn v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464 (Ct. App. 2006). This case
addressed two similar fact patterns, one involving defendant Rhaburn and
another involving defendant Baez. Id. at 466.
135. Id.
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disqualified because it represented a prosecution witness,
Barnett, in a criminal proceeding nine years earlier in
1996.136 The public defender objected to the disqualification,
noting that office records of 1996 cases were kept off-site in a
location unknown to him and that his supervisors had
instructed him to make no inquiries regarding the files.'37
Furthermore, he did not join the office until 2000 and
represented to the court that "he did not feel that the fact
that his office had previously represented Barnett would have
any effect on his cross-examination." 3 8 Nevertheless, the
trial court granted the motion to' disqualify. 139
On appeal, the court discussed California Rule of
Professional Conduct 3-310(E), which provides that an
attorney "may not without the informed consent of the former
client, accept employment adverse to the former client where,
by reason of the representation of the former client, the
[attorney] has obtained confidential information." 4 ° In 1980,
the California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct issued a formal opinion
interpreting Rule 3-310(E), holding that the entire public
defender's office should be disqualified from representing a
defendant where a previous client is also involved in the case
as a potential witness.' 4 ' The court of appeal concluded,
however, that "in the twenty-five years since the State Bar
issued its opinion, courts have begun to develop more flexible
strategies for dealing with potential conflicts, and, in many
cases, have rejected rules [of] automatic disqualification. "142
Specifically, the California Supreme Court held in a number
of criminal cases that no actual or potential conflict of
interest resulted from the former representation of a witness
by the public defender's office, 43 especially when the attorney
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The public defender also strongly objected to the delay in trial that a
substitution would require, and Rhaburn indicated that he felt there was no
conflict and that he wanted to go to trial. Id.
139. Id.
140. Rhaburn, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 469 (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3-310(E) (1992)).
141. Id. (citing State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl. Responsibility &
Conduct, Formal Op. 1980-52).
142. Id. at 471.
143. See id. at 471-73 (citing People v. Cox, 70 P.3d 277 (Cal. 2003); People v.
Lawley, 38 P.3d 461 (Cal. 2002); People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1993)).
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in the matter before the court had not received any pertinent
confidential information from the witness.1"
Based on policy and practicality, the appellate court
found that the trial court "erred in applying a rigid rule of
vicarious disqualification in the situation presented where
trial counsel did not have a 'direct and personal' relationship
with the witness."145 Instead, the appellate court directed the
trial court to evaluate the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether there was a reasonable possibility that
the individual attorney representing defendant had either
obtained confidential information about the witness collected
by his or her office, or may inadvertently acquire such
information through file review, office conversation or
otherwise. 146 The court stressed that in a case "not involving
a 'direct and personal' representation of the witness, the
courts should normally be prepared to accept the
representation of counsel, as an officer of the court, that he or
she has not in fact come into possession of any confidential
information acquired from the witness and will not seek to do
so."* 47  The appellate court noted that its decision was
supported by circumstances specific to the public defender's
office including its heavy caseload, its lack of financial
interest in its cases, and the special expertise it possesses.14 s
144. Id. at 472-73 (citing People v. Cornwell, 117 P.3d 622 (Cal. 2005)).
145. Id. at 475 (citing Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 881
(Ct. App. 2003)). Therefore, the direct acquisition of confidential information
need not and should not be presumed. Id.
146. Rhaburn, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 475. Factors courts should consider
include:
1) the length of time that has elapsed since the witness was
represented by the public defender's office; 2) the nature and notoriety.
• .of the witness' case; 3) whether the current attorney was a member
of the public defender's office at the time of the witness' case, and
whether the attorney responsible for the witness' case remains with the
office; [and] 4) the nature and extent of any measures or procedures
established by the public defender to ensure that information acquired
by one deputy in a previous case is made unavailable to the current
attorney.
Id.
147. Id. at 475.
148. Id. at 473-74. "Public sector lawyers do not have a financial interest in
the matters on which they work. As a result they may have less, if any,
incentive to breach client confidences." Id. (citing Santa Barbara v. Superior
Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 403, 407-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)). "The public defender
need not worry about attracting new clients or retaining the loyalty of former
clients." Id. Interest of the former client is also marginal with no economic
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This decision implicates that government attorneys may
still properly utilize the technique of ethical screening in
order to avoid conflicts of interest in certain circumstances.
This is especially true when this decision is read in light of,
and in contrast to, the Cobra Solutions decision.'49 Overall,
the courts in 2006 provided that screening is insufficient in
instances involving heads of government law offices, 150 and
that screening may be sufficient on a case-by-case basis in
instances involving subordinate lawyers with no direct and
personal relationships with the government office's former
client.' 5'
3. Concurrent and Successive Representation
In a case involving a private law firm, the Second District
Court of Appeal addressed issues of concurrent and
successive representation. 5 2 The case of Fremont Indemnity
Co. v. Fremont General Corp. involved three related
companies: Fremont Indemnity Company (Indemnity),
Fremont Compensation Insurance Group, Inc. (Insurance
Group), and Fremont General Corporation (Fremont
General). 15 3 At one point in time, the law firm of Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius (MLB) represented Indemnity in a legal
malpractice action (the Seyfarth action) at the same time it
represented Fremont General in another unrelated action
(the Gularte action).' Indemnity's interests and Fremont
interest at stake; he accepts representation because he must, not because he
desires a confidant. Id. It is beyond dispute that public defender's offices
handle a high volume of cases-this factor is entitled to substantial
consideration in these cases. Id. at 474. The average public defender "is
unlikely to remember any confidential information imparted by the average
past client." Id. "Frequent disqualifications substantially increase the cost of
legal services for public entities." Id. And public law offices often develop
specific expertise in particular areas of law and disqualification may deprive the
People of the benefits of this acquired and cultivated experience. Id. (citing
Santa Barbara, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 23 n.1). Defendant Rhaburn also had an
interest in conflict-free counsel and he "expressly indicated that he wanted the
public defender to continue." Id.
149. See supra Part III.B.1.
150. City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., 135 P.3d 20
(Cal. 2006).
151. See Rhaburn, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 475.
152. See Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82 (Ct.
App. 2006).
153. Id. at 85.
154. Id.
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General's interests were not adverse to each other in either of
those actions. 55  During the representations, all three
companies became involved in a dispute with one another
regarding the misappropriation of funds, but MLB did not
represent any of the companies regarding that dispute at that
time. 156  In 2004, Indemnity, through the insurance
commissioner as liquidator, filed complaints against
Insurance Group and Fremont General regarding the
misappropriation of funds dispute. 157 MLB represented both
defendants.'518
The trial court disqualified MLB from representing the
defendants in both cases.5 9 It found that MLB violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct regarding concurrent
representation-Rule 3-3 10(C)(3) 16 0-because MLB
represented both Indemnity-in the Seyfarth action-and
Fremont General-in the Gularte action-when the two
companies had conflicting interests with regard to the
misappropriations of funds dispute.' The trial court also
found that MLB violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
regarding successive representation-namely, Rule 3-
310(E)'62 because of its representation of Indemnity in the
Seyfarth action, where MLB would have obtained information
pertaining to Indemnity's litigation philosophies and
155. Id. at 92.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 85-86.
158. Fremont Indem. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 86.
159. Id. at 87-88.
160. Rule of Professional Conduct 3-3 10(C)(3) provides:
(C) A member shall not, without the informed written consent of
each client:
(3) [rlepresent a client in a matter and at the same time in a
separate matter accept as a client a person or entity whose interest in
the first matter is adverse to the client in the first matter.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(C)(3) (1992). "An attorney's dual
representation of parties in those circumstances presents a conflict of interest
even if the two matters are completely unrelated and there is no risk that
confidences obtained in one matter could be used in the other." Fremont Indem.
Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 91 (citing Flatt v. Super. Ct., 885 P.2d 950, 955 (Cal.
1999); People v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 379 (Cal.
1999)).
161. See id. at 86, 88.
162. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-
310(E) (1992)).
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practices. 163
The court of appeal reversed, noting that Rule 3-
310(C)(3) does not prohibit the concurrent representation of
clients whose interests are adverse only in a matter in which
the attorney does not represent either client.'64 Therefore,
MLB's concurrent representation of Indemnity in the
Seyfarth action and Fremont General in the Gularte action
was not a proper basis for disqualification because the clients'
interests in those matters were not adverse, and therefore,
the attorney's duty of loyalty was not implicated.
165
The appellate court also noted that an attorney's
"acquisition during the first representation of general
information about the first client's 'overall structure and
practices' would not of itself require disqualification unless it
were found to be 'material' in the second
representation." 66  On this basis, the appellate court
concluded that because issues in the successive
misappropriation of funds representations were unrelated to
the issues in the initial Seyfarth representation, Indemnity
had not established a reasonable probability that MLB
obtained confidential information material to the present
actions.6 7 In particular, "Indemnity had not shown that
purported information regarding . . . 'litigation philosophies
and practices' was material to any issue in these actions."168
Therefore, disqualification based on the prior representation
of a party was not warranted because there was no
substantial relationship between the two representations.6 9
Although this decision did not necessarily establish a
groundbreaking ethics ruling, it did serve to clarify for
California attorneys the contours of the rules relating to
concurrent and successive representation as they apply to
163. See Fremont Indem. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 86, 88.
164. Id. at 92 (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(C)(3)).
165. Id. "An attorney's concurrent representation of parties with conflicting
interest implicates the duty of loyalty. 'Attorneys have a duty to maintain
undivided loyalty to their clients to avoid undermining public confidences in the
legal profession and the judicial process."' Id. at 90 (citing Santa Clara County
Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142, 1154 n.6 (Cal. 1994)).
166. Id. at 95 (citing SLC Ltd. v. Bradford Group W., 999 F.2d 464, 467-68
(10th Cir. 1993)).
167. Id. Information is material if it is "directly at issue in, or has some
critical importance to, the second representation." Id.
168. Id.
169. Fremont Indem. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 95.
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complex factual situations. Attorneys frequently represent
interrelated companies, and this decision can help attorneys
determine when it is appropriate to continue such
representation when such companies become involved in
disputes with one another.
C. Malpractice
1. Windfall Settlement as a Consequence of Malpractice
Negates Recovery
In 2006, the Third District Court of Appeal determined
that a client was unable to recover in a malpractice action
against her lawyers, even accepting all of her allegations as
true, because the only consequences of the lawyers'
negligence and breach was a windfall settlement for the
client.17° In Slovensky v. Friedman, client Slovensky retained
defendant lawyers to prosecute a personal injury action
against her apartment complex. 17' The claim was eventually
resolved as part of a global settlement involving twenty other
plaintiffs.'72 Following the settlement, Slovensky filed suit
against her lawyers alleging malpractice in that that the
lawyers negligently failed to obtain an adequate recovery for
her. 173
The lawyers did not controvert the alleged facts and
instead moved for summary judgment, asserting that
Slovensky's cause of action for legal malpractice lacked merit
because she could not prove causation for damages.'74 They
claimed that Slovensky could not have obtained a better
result absent the alleged malpractice because her underlying
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations as of
the date she retained defendants. 17 5 Defendants also asserted
170. See Slovensky v. Friedman, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60 (Ct. App. 2006).
171. Id. at 63.
172. See id. at 65. Slovensky's specific claim settled for $340,000. Id.
173. Id. at 62. Slovensky also alleged breach of fiduciary duty in that the
lawyers made misrepresentations to her regarding their pursuit of her case,
failed to advise her of conflicts arising from their course of pursuit, made
repeated false statements and used pressure tactics to force her to settle,
breached confidentiality to enlist her physician as an agent in their campaign
against her, and unilaterally and without notice had her settlement check
reissued to themselves. Id. at 72.
174. See id. at 65.
175. Id.
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that her cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty had "no
existence apart from her malpractice cause of action and thus
it failed on the same ground."176
Both the trial court and the appellate court agreed with
defendants.177 The appellate court first determined as a
matter of law that Slovensky should have realized she had a
cause of action long before she retained defendants.178 The
appellate court then held that "because Slovensky's claim was
time-barred on the day she filed it, she was entitled to no
recovery and would inevitably have lost the case had it not
settled."1 79 Thus, the settlement the defendants obtained for
her was a windfall. 8 ° The appellate court determined that
because defendants' alleged malpractice did not damage
Slovensky, her malpractice claim failed. 81  Likewise, the
court noted that the only apparent consequence of defendants'
fiduciary breach was a substantial settlement that Slovensky
could not have otherwise obtained; therefore, that claim also
failed for lack of damages.
8 2
2. Statute of Limitations Tolling
In another statute of limitations case, the Second District
Court of Appeal addressed the issue of tolling during a
lengthy hiatus where no attorney action was required with
respect to a specific matter. 8 3 In Fritz v. Ehrmann, Fritz sold
a motel to the Patels in return for a promissory note calling
for interest-only payments until the principal was due at the
end of a twenty-year term, with permission to make principal
reduction payments at any time without penalty.' s The note
also provided that one-half of the interest for the first five
years was to be deferred and paid at the end of the note's
term. 8 ' In 1995, Fritz orally modified the agreement with
the Patels whereby they agreed not to prepay the note in
176. Slovensky, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 65.
177. Id. at 63.
178. Id. at 70.
179. Id. at 67.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Slovensky, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 74.
183. See Fritz v. Ehrmann, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 670, 679-82 (Ct. App. 2006).
184. Id. at 671-72.
185. Id. at 671.
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exchange for a reduction in the interest rate. 8 6 Fritz asked
attorney Ehrmann to prepare a new promissory note
reflecting the parties' understanding.1 7  The note Ehrmann
prepared contained the new interest rate, but was silent as to
the deferred interest, and contained the original provision
allowing the Patels to prepay the principal.18  Although the
note was due in 2003, Fritz accepted partial prepayments of
the principal in 2000 and in 2001.189 However, in January
2002, the Patels made what they described to be their last
and final payment. 190 The money amounted to the remainder
of principal, but Fritz contended that they still owed him the
deferred interest.'91 Later, in 2002, the Patels brought suit to
clear their title to the motel, and Fritz filed a cross-complaint
seeking the deferred interest. 9 2 Erhmann represented Fritz
in the lawsuit until he was substituted in 2003.113 The suit
settled a few months later. 194
One month after settling, Fritz sued Ehrmann for
malpractice.'95 Ehrmann admitted that he mistakenly failed
to include the provisions in the second promissory note
regarding the deferred interest payments and the preclusion
of principal prepayment. 196 Ehrmann argued, however, that
Fritz "suffered actual injury from the mistake either when
the note was signed in 1995 or in November 2000, when the
Patels prepaid some of the principal on the note"; therefore,
the statute of limitations had run before Ehrmann even
agreed to represent Fritz in the 2002 litigation over the
note. 9 7  The trial court agreed, and granted Ehrmann's
motion for summary judgment. 19  The court of appeal
186. Id. at 672.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Fritz, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 672. Fritz accepted partial prepayment of
principal on the assumption that such prepayment was not permitted under the
terms of the second note, but he was persuaded that there would be tax benefits
to receiving the payments in increments. Id. at 677.





195. Fritz, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 672.
196. Id. at 672-73.
197. Id. at 673.
198. Id.
892 [Vol: 47
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
reversed. 199
The statute of limitations for attorney malpractice
actions, contained in Section 340.6 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, provides that a malpractice action "shall be
commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or
omission."2 0 The period is tolled, however, if the plaintiff has
not sustained an actual injury, or if the attorney continues to
represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in
which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred.20 1 The
appellate court, unlike the trial court, regarded each of the
omitted provisions in the second promissory note as leading
to two separate potential bases for injury to Fritz.2"2 First, he
could have been injured by the Patel's prepayment of
principal, and second, he could have been injured by the
failure to specify in the note that the deferred interest was to
be repaid at the end of the term.20 3 The court focused on the
second potential injury and noted that Fritz became aware
sometime between January and June of 2002 that the Patels'
refusal to pay deferred interest was due to ambiguity in the
second promissory note.20 4 The malpractice action was filed
in November 2003.205
The court held that summary judgment was
inappropriate in this case because the statute of limitations
had been tolled pursuant to Ehrmann's continuous
representation of Fritz in the matter, even though there was
a lengthy hiatus when no attorney action was required with
respect to the note, although Ehrmann continued to represent
Fritz in other matters.2 6 The court determined that by
"continues to represent" in Section 340.6, the Legislature
meant:
[Tihat the statute of limitations for legal malpractice is
tolled as long as the attorney continues to represent a
199. Id. at 682.
200. Id. at 673 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (Deering 2006)).
201. Fritz, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 673-74 (citing CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.6).
202. See id. at 676, 678.
203. Id. at 676.
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client who comes to him or her after the potential
malpractice manifests itself [in this case 2002 with regard
to the deferred interest] and before the statute of
limitations has run in an attempt to rectify the problem or
mitigate damages.20 7
D. Attorney Fees
1. Attorney Intervention for Statutory Legal Fees
In Lindelli v. San Anselmo, °8 the First District Court of
Appeal addressed the issue of "whether attorneys acting on
their own behalf can intervene in a client's lawsuit and move
for attorney fees" 209 Lindelli dealt specifically with Section
1021.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides for fee awards in cases resulting in the enforcement
of important rights affecting the public interest.210 In the
underlying dispute, the court of appeal held that the Town of
San Anselmo violated certain stay provisions of the Elections
Code by awarding an interim contract for waste management
services to Marin Sanitary Service, notwithstanding the fact
that an earlier ordinance awarding a contract for such
services to Marin Sanitary Service was the subject of an
upcoming referendum election.2" On remand, however, the
successful petitioners, including Lindelli, declined to
authorize their attorneys, Remcho, Johansen & Purcell (RJP),
to file a motion for an award of attorney fees under Section
1021.5.212 RJP was denied leave to intervene to file a motion
for attorney fees on their own behalf.213 Accordingly, RJP
appealed this denial.21 4
The appellate court noted that Section 387(a) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person
who has an interest in the matter in litigation may intervene
in the action.215 Furthermore, a third party may intervene
207. Fritz, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 682.
208. Lindelli v. Town of San Anselmo, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707, 709 (Ct. App.
2006).
209. Id. at 709.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Lindelli v. San Anselmo, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453 (Ct. App. 2006)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 710.
214. See Lindelli, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 710.
215. Id. at 711 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 387(a) (Deering 2006)).
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where: (1) the proposed intervener has a direct interest; (2)
intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and
(3) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition
by the present parties.216  The court concluded that
intervention by RJP satisfied these requirements.217 This
conclusion was based on the California Supreme Court's
holding in Flannery v. Prentice that fees awarded belong to
the attorneys who labored to earn them, absent an agreement
allocating the award to the client.218  Therefore, the court
determined that RJP had standing to move for fees, and that
RJP had sufficient interest in an award of attorney fees to
support a permissive intervention under Section 387(a).21 9
The appellate court also concluded that "petitioner's
ultimate success in obtaining a declaration that the interim
contract violated the . . . Election Code . .. resulted in the
enforcement of an important right and conferred a significant
benefit on the general public."22° Therefore, the necessity and
financial burden of the private enforcement of this public
benefit made an attorney fee award to RJP appropriate.22'
2. Successor Counsel and Contingency Fees
In an opinion on review after remand by the California
Supreme Court, the Review Department of the State Bar
Court of California found in In the Matter of Van Sickle222
that successor counsel who claimed an entire contingency fee
for himself in a personal injury action and expected the client
to compensate her previous attorney out of her recovery
charged an unconscionable fee and should be suspended from
practice.223 The court also concluded that attorney Van Sickle
was culpable of charging an unconscionable fee in violation of
California Rule of Professional Conduct 4-200(A)2 4 regarding
216. Id. (citing U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. State, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689 (Ct. App.
2001)).
217. Id. at 718.
218. Id. at 713 (citing Flannery v. Prentice, 28 P.3d 860, 871 (Cal. 2006)).
219. Id. at 710.
220. Lindelli, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722.
221. Id.
222. In the Matter of David M. Van Sickle, 2006 WL 2465633 (Cal. Bar Ct.).
223. See id. at 19.
224. Rule of Professional Conduct 4-200(A) provides that "a] member shall
not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or unconscionable
fee." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-200(A) (1992).
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a contingency fee he collected for his client's worker's
compensation claims.225
As to the personal injury action, Van Sickle failed to
disclose to his client that no portion of his thirty-five percent
contingency fee would go to the client's previous counsel in
the matter, and that therefore, the client would have to pay
the previous counsel from her remaining recovery. 26 Van
Sickle thus failed to disclose the true facts, such that the fee
charged under the circumstances constituted a practical
appropriation of the client's funds under the guise of
retaining them as fees.227 Although void for lack of mutual
assent, the agreement between Van Sickle and his client
nevertheless presented strong evidence of Van Sickle's
overreaching, since it contained express provisions that were
anathema to his fiduciary relationship with his client, and
indeed were against the public policy of California. 228  The
agreement prohibited the client from settling or dismissing
her case unless Van Sickle agreed, and it expressly prohibited
her from substituting another attorney unless Van Sickle
consented.229
As to the worker's compensation case, the court found
that Van Sickle was not entitled to any contingency fee for his
representation of the client in the matter.230  This was
because the contingency agreement specified that Van Sickle
would receive twenty-five percent of benefits, settlement, or
judgment arising from the claim, yet Van Sickle did not
obtain any benefits for his client; therefore, the contingency
never occurred.23'
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
1. Misstatement of the Law and Failure to Object
In 2006, the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed a
225. Van Sickle, 2006 WL 2465633, at 6.
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing Herrscher v. State Bar, 49 P.2d 832, 833 (Cal. 1935)).
228. Id. at 8.
229. Id.
230. Id. (emphasis in original).
231. Van Sickle, 2006 WL 2465633, at 8-9. The client only received medical
reimbursement that she had obtained herself prior to hiring Van Sickle. Id.
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situation where the prosecutor misstated the law, and
defense counsel failed to object.232 In People v. Anzalone,
defendant Anzalone was convicted of four counts of attempted
murder.233 Anzalone's attempt to steal a car owned by Love
was thwarted when Love and three others were able to stop
him, causing Anzalone to flee.234  A few minutes later,
Anzalone drove by the four men and fired two shots into the
group, barely missing one person's head.23 At trial, Anzalone
claimed that he could not have fired the shots because he was
in another location stealing someone else's vehicle at the.
time.236
On appeal, Anzalone asserted prosecutorial misconduct
and ineffective assistance of counsel.23 7 The appellate court
found that the prosecutor erroneously told the jury that
Anzalone's two shots could amount to four attempted
murders because anytime persons are within a "zone of
danger," the "indiscriminate firing of a shot at those persons
amounts to an attempted murder of everyone in the group."238
The appellate court noted that "[ciontrary to the prosecutor's
argument, an attempted murder is not committed as to all
persons in a group simply because a gunshot is fired
indiscriminately at them."239 In fact:
[T]o be found guilty of attempted murder, the defendant
must either have intended to kill a particular individual..
. or the nature of his attack must be such that it is
reasonable to infer that the defendant intended to kill
everyone in a particular location as the means . .. to
232. See People v. Anzalone, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876 (Ct. App. 2006).
233. Id. at 878.
234. Id. at 878-79.
235. Id. at 879.
236. Id. at 880. Additionally, a shoe left behind near Love's car was about an
inch-and-a-half too large to fit on Anzalone's foot. Id.
237. Id. at 878. Anzalone argued that defense counsel also provided
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to object to comments by the
prosecutor during argument suggesting that the reason the shoe found at the
scene was not Anzalone's size was because Anzalone was an admitted thief and
had probably stolen the shoes. Id. at 886. The court noted that attorneys are
not required to make every conceivable objection and that counsel could
reasonably have decided it was better to let the comment stand than risk
irritating the jury by objection, especially when the alibi defense was based on
Anzalone's status as a thief. Id.
238. Anzalone, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 885.
239. Id.
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killing some particular person. 240
The appellate court found that the prosecutor's argument
concerning zone of danger was erroneous and misleading and
that he committed error when he misstated the law relevant
to the definition of attempted murder.241  However, no
objection was interposed to that misstatement, thereby
waiving the issue of prosecutorial error.242
The appellate court concluded that the "defense counsel
was prejudicially ineffective in failing to object to the
prosecutor's misstatements of the law as to three of the four
attempted murder counts."243 It reasoned that had counsel
objected, there was a reasonable probability that the results
of the proceeding would have been different.2" The
prosecutor left the jury with the "mistaken impression that by
firing indiscriminately in the direction of a group of men,
Anzalone was guilty of attempting to kill them all... [which]
greatly lessened the People's burden of proof."245 The court
found that "given the nature of the shooting, had the
prosecutor's misstatement of the law been corrected after an
objection, it was reasonably probable [that] the jury would not
have found Anzalone guilty of all four counts of attempted
murder."2 46 Therefore, the court reversed three of Anzalone's
attempted murder convictions.247
2. Failure to Present Evidence of Battered Women's
Syndrome
In another case regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that a
client was denied her constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel because her lawyer failed to investigate
and present evidence on battered women's syndrome
(BWS). 48  In the case of In re Nourn, the underlying facts
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing People v. Valdez, 82 P.3d 296, 333 (Cal. 2004)). The portion of
the court's opinion specifically addressing prosecutorial misconduct is not
certified for publication. Id. at 876 n.1.
243. Id. at 887.
244. Anzalone, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 887.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 888.
248. See In re Nourn, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 51-52 (Ct. App. 2006).
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involve seventeen-year-old Nourn, who began having an
affair with Ronald Barker, a married thirty-four-year-old man
whom she met on the Internet.249 Barker was jealous and
controlling, and told Nourn that if she left him, he would kill
her, as he claimed to have done to other girlfriends.250 When
Barker learned that Nourn had sex with another man, he
threatened to kill the other man, Stevens. 25 1 Fearing that
Barker would break up with her, Nourn claimed that she
would do anything Barker told her to do.252 Nourn then went
to Stevens' apartment and lied, telling him that her car had
broken down.253 The two of them left in Stevens' car and
Barker followed.254 At one point, Nourn had Stevens pull the
car over and Barker came up, grabbed Stevens by the neck
and shot him in the head.2 5  After moving Stevens' car,
Barker poured gasoline on it and set it on fire, while Nourn
"just did what [Barker] told [her]."256 Barker threatened
Nourn by telling her that if she told anyone about the
murder, he would kill her.257 After three years of silence,
Nourn contacted the police and confessed to her role in the
murder.258
At trial, the prosecutor argued that "Nourn was guilty of
first degree murder based solely on the accomplice theory that
she aided and abetted Barker's assault on Stevens and that
Barker's murder of Stevens was a natural and probable
consequence of that assault."259  Nourn's defense counsel,
Cormicle, argued that Nourn did not intend to kill or assault
Stevens and that Barker "abused, controlled and manipulated
her behavior. "260 He made this argument even though he
later admitted that he knew that duress was not a defense to
murder.261 Nourn was convicted of premeditated murder and
249. Id. at 35.
250. See id. at 41-42.
251. Id. at 35.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. Nourn, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 35.
255. Id. at 35-36.
256. Id. at 36.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 34-35.
259. Id. at 36 (emphasis in original).
260. Nourn, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 37.
261. See id. at 47.
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arson.
262
Based on its review of the record, including the
declarations of BWS and criminal defense experts, the
appellate court concluded that the performance of Nourn's
trial counsel was "below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."263
Nourn's defense counsel did not use any experts, nor did he
have Nourn undergo a psychological evaluation.264 Cormicle
"indicated that he knew Nourn's mental state was at issue
but did not think that an expert would help him understand
why Nourn went along with what Barker did."265
Additionally, Nourn told Cormicle that she lied to the police
when she told them "that she did not know Barker was going
to shoot Stevens until he did so."266  Based on those
confidential statements, Cormicle decided that the version
Nourn told the police presented the most sympathetic version
of her participation in the homicide.267
The court found that Cormicle "did not conduct an
adequate investigation based on the information he
possessed, which, had it been performed, may have produced
evidence regarding Nourn's state of mind and duress at the
time she made confidential statements to [him]... 26 Had
Cormicle "conducted an adequate investigation and received
that evidence, he would have had an informed basis upon
which to make a tactical decision whether or not to not
present that evidence at trial. .... ,269 The court found that
"under prevailing professional norms, [Cormicle] had no
reason not to have Nourn psychologically evaluated for
possible BWS, state of mind, duress, or other defenses."270
Evaluations by experts may have revealed that Nourn's
confidential statements were not in fact true, especially in
262. Id. at 37.
263. Id. at 51.
264. Id. at 51, 54.
265. Id. at 48-49.
266. Nourn, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 47. She told Cormicle that what actually
happened was that Barker asked her: "If you love me so much, if I told you to
kill him for me, would you do it?" Id. Nourn then said that she would, but did
not know how. Id.
267. Id. at 47.
268. Id. at 51.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 52.
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light of Barker's threats to kill her family if she did not take
responsibility for the murder.27' Additionally, even if Nourn's
statements were believed to be true, "the evaluations could
have concluded that the confidential statements were not
inconsistent with BWS and did not preclude a possible BWS,
state of mind, duress or other defense."272 Overall, the court
concluded that had counsel presented BWS or other
psychological evidence at trial, it is reasonably probable that
Nourn would have received a more favorable result. 273 The
"absence of an adequate investigation and the results of that
investigation undermined the court's confidence in the
outcome of Nourn's trial."2
74
The court also concluded that duress can be a defense to
a charge of murder . 7  This defense only applies, however, if
the prosecution's theory is "that the defendant aided and
abetted the commission of a predicate . . . offense and a
confederate's murder of the victim was a natural and
probable consequence of that predicate . . . offense."276
Therefore, the defense of duress would have been a valid
defense theory had Cormicle actually presented sufficient
evidence of duress at trial rather than just mentioning the
theory in closing argument. 7  Furthermore, BWS evidence
would also have been relevant, and therefore admissible, on a
state of mind or mental state defense, because the intent
requirement for aiding and abetting is specific intent.2 7 The
court concluded that the record contained substantial
evidence that, if obtained and presented at trial, BWS and
psychological expert opinions would support a finding that it
was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Nourn had
the requisite specific intent to commit, encourage or facilitate
Barker's commission of the assault on Stevens.2 7 9 Finally, the
court noted that "BWS evidence, if presented at trial, could
have assisted the jury in understanding why Nourn made
certain statements and could have explained her behavior
271. Id.
272. Nourn, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
273. Id. at 61.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 56-57.
276. Id. at 56.
277. Id. at 57-58.
278. Nourn, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58-59.
279. Id. at 59.
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during and after the incident, including her confidential
statements to [Cormicle] ..."'o
F. Duty of Lawyer Acting as Escrow Holder
In Virtanen v. O'Connell, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal addressed the issue of a lawyer's duties as an escrow
holder.281  Attorney O'Connell, of the firm Parker Milliken,
represented the purchaser of stock that was being sold by
Virtanen.8 2 O'Connell agreed to act as the escrow holder for
the transaction, and Virtanen delivered the stock certificates
under a cover letter containing the conditions of escrow.28 3 A
few days later, Virtanen sent notice of rescission of the
transaction and a demand for the return of the documents to
both O'Connell and the purchaser.2" This notwithstanding,
O'Connell proceeded to close escrow and deliver the stock
certificates to the transfer agent.28 5 Virtanen sued O'Connell
and Parker Milliken for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty
and conversion.8 6 The jury found for Virtanen and awarded
compensatory damages, but deadlocked on the issue of
punitive damages. 2 7 The trial court denied Virtanen's motion
for a partial new trial as to punitive damages against
O'Connell and Parker Milliken.8 8
On appeal, the court concluded that O'Connor breached
his duty as escrow holder. 2 9  He closed the transaction
"before the conditions of the escrow instructions had been
satisfied, before the parties had reached agreement on
material contract terms, and after he had received a notice of
rescission and a demand for return of the documents."29 ° The
court found that "[wihen an attorney faces conflicting
demands from his or her own client and another party to the
280. Id. at 61.
281. See Virtanen v. O'Connell, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 705 (Ct. App. 2006).
282. Id. at 705. The firm's full name is Parker, Milliken, Clark, O'Hara &
Samuelian. Id. at 706.
283. Id. at 707-08.
284. Id. at 707.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 708.
287. Virtanen, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 708.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 705-06. The court also found that he converted the stock when he
forwarded the certificates to the transfer agent. Id. at 705.
290. Id.
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escrow, the attorney cannot favor his or her own client and
completely disregard the rights of the other party, to whom
he or she owes a duty as an escrow holder."291 If the
competing demands are not resolved, the law provides the
attorney with a mechanism to avoid both the competing
demands and tort liability by filing an interpleader action.292
The attorney is not permitted to convert the escrowed
property for his or her client's own use.293
The appellate court found that there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that
Virtanen showed "by clear and convincing proof that
O'Connell acted in such a conscious and deliberate disregard
for the rights of Virtanen that his conduct could be
characterized as willful or wanton, giving rise to a punitive
damages award."294  Therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a retrial as to punitive damages against
O'Connell. 295 However, the appellate court concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a retrial as
to punitive damages against Parker Milliken.296  This was
because there was no evidence that Parker Milliken: (1) had
advance knowledge of any unfitness of O'Connell; (2) had
authorized or ratified his wrongful conduct; or (3) had itself
committed fraud or acted with oppression or malice.297
IV. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION
In 2005, for the third time, the California Legislature
introduced a bill that would permit an exception to the duty
of confidentiality for government attorneys who learn of
government misconduct.29 In 2006, this third attempt
faltered when the bill was withdrawn by its author.299
291. Id. at 706.
292. Id.
293. Virtanen, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706.
294. Id. at 722-23 (describing punitive damages award under CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(a) (Deering 2006)).
295. Id. at 724.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 723-24. Moreover, there was no evidence that O'Connell was an
officer, director or managing agent of Parker Milliken. Id.
298. Pamela Glazner, Ethics Year in Review, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957,
984 (2006).
299. Bob Egelko, Bill to Aid Lawyers Who Blow Whistle is Withdrawn, S.F.
CHRON., Jun. 13, 2006, at B2. The two former attempts were met with
gubernatorial vetoes by Gray Davis in 2002 and Arnold Schwarzenegger in
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Assembly Bill 1612 (AB 1612) would have created a statutory
exception to every California attorney's duty "[t]o maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or
herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client.""'
Specifically, the bill would have authorized an attorney who,
"in the course of representing a governmental organization,
learns of improper governmental activity, as defined, to [first]
urge reconsideration of the matter and to refer it to a higher
authority in the organization."30 1 The bill would have also
authorized the attorney, in specified circumstances, to refer
the matter to a law enforcement agency or to another
governmental agency and would have exempted the attorney
from disciplinary action for making the referral.30 2
Previous efforts to create this exception have consistently
failed, but the position of the California State Bar on the
matter has not been as consistent.3  In 2001, the State Bar
worked with proponents of the legislation to develop
amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct that would
allow government lawyer whistleblowing3 °4 These proposed
amendments were subsequently rejected by the California
Supreme Court.30 5  Then, the State Bar was neutral with
regard to the two legislative attempts prior to AB 1612 to
codify the exception. 06 In 2006, however, the State Bar
actively opposed AB 1612.307
One reason for the State Bar's opposition was the
previous and consistent failure of lawyer whistleblower
protections. °  When Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
vetoed a similar bill in 2004, he stated:
This is a well-intended bill and I applaud the efforts to
expose wrongdoing within government. However, this bill
2004. Glazner, supra note 298, at 986.
300. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (Deering 2006).
301. Assemb. B. 1612, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005), available at
http'//www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm (choose "(2005-2006)"
from "Session" drop-down menu; then enter "1612" in "Bill Number" field; then
click "Search" button; then follow "Amended - 01/04/2006" hyperlink).
302. Cal. Assemb. B. 1612.
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would condone violations of the attorney-client privilege,
which is the cornerstone of our legal system. This bill will
have a chilling effect on when government officials would
have an attorney present when making decisions. 309
The State Bar asserted in 2006 that the principal of
confidentiality was "under siege," citing confidentiality
exceptions in the ABA Model Rules, federal Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation, and U.S. Sentencing Commission guidelines
encouraging waiver of attorney-client confidentiality. 30 The
State Bar asserted itself against this siege, and relegated the
issue of government lawyer whistleblowers to the Rules
Revision Commission for consideration in its rewriting of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct.311
In 2006, AB 1612 passed in the California Assembly and
was awaiting its initial Senate Committee hearing in June
2006, when its author, Assemblymember Fran Pavley,
withdrew it.3"2 Pavley claimed that even if the bill passed, it
faced an almost certain veto from Governor
Schwarzenegger.1 3 Pavely based this conclusion on the fact
that the bill was failing to gain any backing from Republicans
in the Legislature.1 4 In light of the tumultuous history of
proposed exceptions to the duty of confidentiality for
government lawyer whistleblowers in California, it seems
highly unlikely that it will arise yet again in the near future.
V. NATIONAL ETHICS ISSUES
A. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal
Corporate Prosecutions
The Department of Justice maintains a policy making
waiver of the attorney-client privilege a factor to be used by
309. Public Agency Attorneys: Concomitant Duties to Clients and to Public,
Assemb. B. 1612, 2005-06 Leg. (Cal. 2006), available at
http'J/www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm (choose "(2005-2006)"
from "Session" drop-down menu; then enter "1612" in "Bill Number" field; then
click "Search" button; then follow "Assembly Committee - 01/13/06" hyperlink
under "Analyses" heading).
310. McCarthy, supra note 303.
311. Id.
312. Bob Egelko, Bill to Aid Lawyers Who Blow Whistle is Withdrawn, S.F.
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federal prosecutors in determining whether to criminally
charge a corporation. 15 This policy was articulated in a 2003
memorandum by then-Deputy United States Attorney
General Larry Thompson as a result of the increasing number
of corporate criminal investigations. 16 The effect of this
"Thompson Memorandum" was to place pressure on potential
corporate defendants to waive the privilege in order to avoid
an indictment.3 17 Following the Department of Justice's lead,
the United States Sentencing Commission changed its
sentencing guidelines in 2004 to encourage corporate waivers
of the attorney-client privilege.318 Under these organizational
sentencing guidelines, "a company could obtain a lesser
sentence if it cooperated with the government."31 9  In
particular, "the amended guidelines listed waiver of the
attorney-client privilege as an element of cooperation." 321 At
the behest of the ABA and several other organizations,
including the California State Bar Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct, the United States
Sentencing Commission voted in April 2006 to remove the
mention of waiver from the guidelines.321
The Department of Justice itself has been working on
revisions to the privilege waiver policy since September 2006,
after being urged to do so by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.2 2 However, unsatisfied with the Department's
lack of progress, Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), outgoing
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced a
315. Keith Paul Bishop & Steven K. Hazen, Attorney-Client Confidentiality in
the Post-Enron Prosecutorial World, 48 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 46, 48 (2006).
316. Id.; Wayne Gross & John Hueston, A Delicate Balancing Act: Measures
to Prevent Another Enron, 48 ORANGE COUNTY LAw. 51 (2006).




321. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing
Commission Votes to Amend Guidelines for Terrorism, Firearms, and Steroids
(Apr. 11, 2006), at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/re10406.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2007). This change took effect on November 1, 2006. Id. Compare U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8C2.5, cmt. 12 (2006), available at
http'//www.ussc.gov/2006guid/tabconO6 _.htm, with U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8C2.5, cmt. 12 (2005), available at
httpJ/www.ussc.gov/2005guid/tabconO5_l.htm.
322. Specter Introduces Bill to Reverse DOJ Policy Forcing Privilege Waivers,
75 U.S. L. WK. 2341 (2006).
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bill on December 7, 2006, to overturn the policy completely.323
The bill would prohibit prosecutors from considering the
waiver of the attorney-client or work product privilege as part
of any cooperation determination. 324 The policy as it currently
stands is opposed by a diverse range of groups including the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), business groups and
defense counsel groups.2' The bill expired at the end of the
109th Congress, but Specter plans to reintroduce the bill in
the 110th Congress in 2007.326
B. American Bar Association Formal Opinions
Although California has not adopted the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, they may serve as guidelines
absent on-point California authority or conflicting state
public policy.32 7 Every year, the ABA issues formal opinions
based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct addressing
hypothetical fact situations.2 s California attorneys should
therefore take note that seven such formal opinions were
issued in 2006.329
First, ABA Formal Opinion 06-438 addressed the issue of
323. Id.
324. Id. The bill would also eliminate the following factors from
consideration: the company's deiision to provide counsel for an employee under
investigation; the company's decision to contribute toward payment of an
employee's attorney fees; the decision to enter into a joint defense agreement
with an employee; the decision to share information with an employee; or the
failure to terminate an employee under investigation. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. The 109th Congress adjourned on December 8, 2006. Id.
327. City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., 135 P.3d 20,
29 (Cal. 2006); see also State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl.
Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1998-152 (stating that the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct may be considered as a collateral source,
particularly in areas where there is no direct authority with the public policy of
California).
328. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-
438, at n.1 (2006) [hereinafter Formal Op. 06-438].
329. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-
444 (2006) [hereinafter Formal Op. 06-444]; ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-443 (2006) [hereinafter Formal Op.
06-443]; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-
442 (2006) [hereinafter Formal Op. 06-442]; ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006) [hereinafter Formal Op.
06-441]; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-
440 (2006) [hereinafter Formal Op. 06-440]; ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Formal
Op. 06-439]; Formal Op. 06-438, supra note 328.
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a lawyer proposing to make or accept an aggregate settlement
or an aggregated agreement.330  The opinion notes that in
seeking to obtain the informed consent of multiple clients to
make or accept an offer of an aggregate settlement or
aggregated agreement of their claims, a lawyer must make a
number of disclosures to each client.33' Under Model Rule
1.8(g), 332 a lawyer is required to advise each client of the
following: the total amount or result of the settlement or
agreement; the amount and nature of every client's
participation in the settlement or agreement; the fees and
costs to be paid to the lawyer from the proceeds or by an
opposing party; and the method by which the costs are to be
apportioned to each client.33 The opinion concludes that
Model Rule 1.8(g)334 is a prophylactic rule designed to protect
clients who are represented by the same lawyer and whose
claims or defenses are jointly negotiated and resolved through
settlement or by agreement.3 Unique and difficult conflicts
between the clients and their lawyer, and between the clients
themselves, are possible.3 16 By complying with Rule 1.8(g),337
the lawyer protects his clients and himself, and helps to
assure the finality and enforceability of the aggregate
settlement or agreement into which those clients have chosen
to enter.338
Second, Formal Opinion 06-439 addressed a lawyer's
ethical obligations as applied to mediations 39 The opinion
specifically analyzes caucused mediations where a third-party
neutral meets with parties individually in confidence, and
thus controls the flow of information in an attempt to resolve
a dispute.3 40 The opinion concludes that under Model Rule
4. 1, 341 in the context of a negotiation, including a caucused
330. Formal Op. 06-438, supra note 328, at 1.
331. Id.
332. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2003).
333. Formal Op. 06-438, supra note 328, at 1.
334. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g).
335. Formal Op. 06-438, supra note 328, at 3.
336. Id.
337. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g).
338. Formal Op. 06-438, supra note 328, at 3.
339. Formal Op. 06-439, supra note 329, at 3.
340. Id.
341. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1 provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person;
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mediation, a lawyer representing a party may not make a
false statement of material fact to a third person. 42 However,
statements regarding a party's negotiating goals or its
willingness to compromise, as well as statements that can
fairly be characterized as "puffing," are ordinarily not
considered "false statements of material fact" within the
meaning of the Model Rules.343  Whether a particular
statement should be regarded as one of material fact may
depend on the circumstances.344
Third, Formal Opinion 06-440 withdrew a formal opinion
from 1994 and reaffirmed a 2005 opinion.345 The opinion
states that Model Rule 4.4(b)346 requires only that a lawyer
who receives a document relating to the representation of the
lawyer's client and who knows or reasonably should know
that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly
notify the sender.3 4' Furthermore, if the materials are not
inadvertently sent, Model Rule 4.4 does not apply. 4 s
Fourth, Formal Opinion 06-441 addressed the ethical
obligations of lawyers who represent indigent criminal
defendants when excessive caseloads interfere with
or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 [regarding confidentiality of
information].
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2004).
342. Formal Op. 06-439, supra note 329, at 3.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 2 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1, cmt. 2 (2003)).
345. ABA Formal Op. 06-440, supra note 329 (withdrawing ABA Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994), and
affirming ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 05-437 (2005)).
346. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) provides that "a lawyer
who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client
and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently
sent shall promptly notify the sender." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.4(b).
347. Formal Op. 06-440 at 2, supra note 329. ABA Formal Opinion 94-382
stated that that in the case of receipt of such materials the lawyer was to:
refrain from reviewing the materials; notify the adverse party/lawyer; follow
lawyer's instructions; or refrain from reviewing materials until resolution of any
dispute over the documents. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility,
Formal Op. 94-382 (1994). This opinion was withdrawn because its conclusion
was not based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct themselves. Formal
Op. 06-440, supra note 329, at 2.
348. Formal Op. 06-440, supra note 329, at 2
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competent and diligent representation. 34 9 The opinion states
that "[i]f workload prevents a lawyer from providing
competent and diligent representation to existing clients, she
must not accept any new clients."35 ° If the clients are being
assigned through a court appointment system, "the lawyer
should request that the court not make any new
appointments."35' If the lawyer is currently representing a
client and cannot provide competent and diligent
representation, the lawyer must move to withdraw from the
representation.352 If the court denies the lawyer's motion to
withdraw, "the lawyer must continue the representation
while taking whatever steps are feasible to ensure that she
will be able to competently and diligently represent the
defendant."35 3  In addition to the attorneys themselves,
supervisors "must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
other lawyers in the office conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct."3 4 To that end, "supervising attorneys
must, working closely with the lawyers they supervise,
monitor the workload of the attorneys to ensure that their
workloads do not exceed a level that may be competently
handled by the individual lawyers."3 5
Fifth, Formal Opinion 06-442 concerned a lawyer's
review and use of metadata 6  The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct "do not contain any specific prohibition
against a lawyer's reviewing and using embedded information
in electronic documents ... The opinion concludes that
the Rules generally permit lawyers to review and use
metadata, such as embedded information contained in email
and other electronic documents, whether received from
opposing counsel, an adverse party, or an agent of an adverse
349. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 329.





355. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 329, at 1.
356. Formal Op. 06-442, supra note 329. Metadata is "structured, encoded
data that describes characteristics of information-bearing entities to aid in the
identification, discovery, assessment, and management of the described
entities." Wikipedia, Metadata, www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/metadata (last
visited Apr. 8, 2007).
357. Formal Op. 06-442, supra note 329, at 1.
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party.3, 8 Metadata may include information pertaining to the
date and time that information was saved, the name of the
computer that created the document, redline edits, and
embedded comments. 359 Lawyers who are concerned about
the transmission of metadata can take measures to protect
themselves, including avoiding use of certain editing
functions, scrubbing or deleting edits, and using hard copies,
scans or faxes rather than email.36 °
Sixth, Formal Opinion 06-443 addressed the issue of
contact between an opposing lawyer and the inside counsel of
an organization regarding a matter when the organization is
represented in that matter by outside counsel.36' Model Rule
4.2 prohibits a lawyer representing a client from
communicating about the subject of the representation with a
person the lawyer knows is represented by another lawyer in
the matter.62 The opinion concludes that Model Rule 4.2363
generally does not prohibit a lawyer who represents a client
in a matter involving an organization from communicating
with the organization's inside counsel about the subject of
that representation, even without obtaining the prior consent
of the entity's outside counsel.364 The purpose of Model Rule
4.2365 is to prevent a skilled advocate from taking advantage
of a non-lawyer and to protect a client against possible
overreaching, interference with the client-lawyer
relationship, and the disclosure of information regarding the
representation without the advice of counsel.366  The
protections provided by Model Rule 4.2 are not needed when
the constituent of the organization is a lawyer-employee of
that organization who is acting as a lawyer for that
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1-2.
360. Id. at 5.
361. Formal Op. 06-443, supra note 329.
362. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2 provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court
order.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2003).
363. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4,2.
364. Formal Op. 06-443, supra note 329, at 1.
365. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2.
366. Formal Op. 06-443, supra note 329, at 1.
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organization.3 67  Additionally, inside counsel may always
avoid such contact by referring the opposing lawyer to other
inside or outside counsel. 6 s
Finally, Formal Opinion 06-444 discussed the
permissibility of restrictive covenants in lawyer agreements
concerning benefits upon retirement. 69  The opinion
concludes that under Model Rule 5.6(a),370 a lawyer may
participate in an agreement that restricts the right of a
lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship only if
the agreement concerns benefits upon retirement.3 7 1  The
provision must affect benefits that are available only to a
lawyer who is in fact retiring from the practice of law, and
cannot impose a forfeiture of income already earned by the
lawyer. 72  Beyond that, law firms and employers have
significant latitude in shaping the nature and scope of the
restrictions on practice and the penalties for
noncompliance.373
VI. CONCLUSION
The year of 2006 was rich with ethical developments in
California and the nation. The California State Bar's
proposed new rules regarding permanent disbarment
sanctions and malpractice insurance disclosure requirements
demonstrate a focus on the public's perception of lawyers. 74
The State Bar Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct focused its efforts in 2006 on
clarifying the California Rules of Professional Conduct as
they apply to financial issues, including liens and trust
accounts.375
367. Id.
368. Id. at 2.
369. Formal Op. 06-444, supra note 329.
370. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 5.6(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other
similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice
after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning
benefits upon retirement.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a) (2003).
371. Formal Op. 06-444, supra note 329, at 1.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See supra Part II.A.
375. See supra Part II.B.
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The California Supreme Court commissioned a study to
determine if California's nonprofit organizations that practice
law must be subject to additional regulation.376 It also
created an automatic vicarious disqualification rule for
government law offices in situations where the head of the
office has a conflict.377 The various California courts of appeal
dealt with issues of a defrocked lawyer's practice of law,37
ethical screening for government law offices, 79  and
concurrent and successive representation of related corporate
entities." They also addressed issues of malpractice when a
client gained a windfall settlement,38 ' malpractice statute of
limitations tolling,38 2 and an attorney's right to intervene on
his or her own behalf for legal fees. 3  Additionally, the courts
of appeal ruled on the ineffective assistance of counsel where
a lawyer failed to object to a prosecutor's misstatement of the
law 3 4 and where a lawyer failed to present evidence of
Battered Women's Syndrome. 5 The appellate courts also
addressed a lawyer's duty as escrow holder in the face of
conflicting duties to his client.38 6 Finally, the State Bar Court
faced the situation of a lawyer charging an unconscionable
fee.38 7
California continued to emphasize the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality to his or her clients with the withdrawal of a
bill for a proposed exception to this duty in the instance of
government wrongdoing.3 The United States Sentencing
Commission demonstrated a focus on confidentiality as well
with the amendment of its sentencing guidelines as they
apply to the attorney-client privilege.38 9  Likewise, a bill of
similar effect was introduced in the United States Senate
with regard to the Department of Justice policies toward the
376. See supra Part III.A.1.
377. See supra Part III.B.1.
378. See supra Part III.A.2.
379. See supra Part III.B.2.
380. See supra Part III.B.3.
381. See supra Part III.C.1.
382. See supra Part III.C.2.
383. See supra Part III.D.1.
384. See supra Part III.E.1.
385. See supra Part III.E.2.
386. See supra Part III.F.
387. See supra Part III.D.2.
388. See supra Part IV.
389. See supra Part V.A.
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privilege. 9 °
Despite the interesting changes in 2006, the ethics
landscape will undoubtedly change significantly within the
next two years with the release of the new California Rules of
Professional Conduct. 9' In 2007, attorneys will continue to
have the opportunity to comment on these proposed rules.392
In 2008, California attorneys will be charged with the task of
familiarizing themselves with the new rules-in both content
and format. Similarly, California courts will attempt to
define and clarify the new rules as they apply to the endless
situations that arise in the realm of legal ethics.
390. See supra Part V.A.
391. See supra Part II.A.
392. See supra Part II.A.
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